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Government-Sponsored Chaplains and Crisis:
Walking the Fine Line in Disaster Response
and Daily Life
by MARY JEAN DOLAN*
Two significant public issues have been the limits of partnership
between government and religion and government's role in helping citizens
cope with disasters. One intriguing intersection of these issues is local
governments' use of chaplaincy programs to address the human face of
trauma, both large-scale and personal. This Article asserts that the
constitutional analysis differs for mass disaster response and the daily
human dramas, clearly painful, addressed by local police and fire
departments. There is an important and valid role for clergy and faith-
based assistance as part of the broad spectrum of governmental disaster
relief. In the everyday tragedies, however, any governmental facilitation of
religious counsel must be a true accommodation based on a victim's
request and not the automatic result of a 911 call. Analyzing Establishment
Clause constraints in these two scenarios leads to a new working model for
analysis of all government-sponsored chaplain programs, just as one of
them is now being challenged after some twenty years of litigation silence
on this topic.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, gave rise to a new
national focus by all on emergency preparedness.' The nation's clergy
* Assistant Professor, The John Marshall Law School. I would like to thank Daniel J. Hynan for
his invaluable support, Leah Heinecke-Krumhus for research assistance, and the wonderful
colleagues, clients and community leaders with whom I had the opportunity to work in the City of
Chicago on emergency preparedness and response.
1. A few examples among many include: creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (see http://www.dhs.gov), national emergency exercises, such as the multi-agency
bioterrorist simulation, TOPOFF2 in May 2003, and new state laws authorizing multiple
emergency powers, including quarantine and isolation without prior court order. See, e.g., H.R.
5164, 93rd Gen. Assem., P.A. 93-829 (I11. 2004).
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were among those rallying to respond. In the intervening years, much
critical work has been done to develop credentialing and training programs,
which prepare clergy to respond in a manner both respectful of victims'
beliefs and conditions and consistent with the needs of law enforcement
and humanitarian aid.3 These nascent plans showed some success in the
country's next mass disaster: Hurricane Katrina and its refugee
resettlement. Local governments relied on clergy to accommodate the
religious needs of survivors, who lacked access to their ordinary religious
support systems.4 In large- or even medium-scale disasters, there is room
for this partnership under the broad tent of governmental and non-profit
emergency response.
Simultaneously, a new, smaller scale initiative has expanded,
encouraged by the Bush administration's faith-based initiative 5 and
Supreme Court trends. A growing number of local governments are calling
on volunteer chaplains to provide immediate (and unrequested) on-the-
scene support to persons who have been traumatized by tragic incidents,
such as homicide, suicide, or accidents.6 That type of program, referred to
here as the "Crisis Chaplaincy Model," has two unconstitutional aspects.
First, the identifiable use of the term "chaplain" as an integral and
automatic part of a local police department's urgent crisis response is
governmental endorsement of religion and inherently coercive. Second,
this model imposes a religious test on its volunteers. Some programs are
open only to clergy, while in others a potential volunteer must produce a
detailed letter of reference from his or her ordained clergy.
The impropriety is especially clear in light of secular programs
provided by municipalities with greater sensitivity to their constitutional
obligations and to the vulnerability of victims, such as Los Angeles' "Crisis
Response Team.",7  No one can doubt the good intentions, selfless
dedication, and frequent effectiveness of crisis chaplains. The
Establishment Clause requirement is that when crisis counseling is
provided in partnership with government's first responders, its focus must
be humanistic, not religious and, as even passionate advocates of
2. The legacy of the FDNY Catholic Chaplain who perished with New York City's firemen
heroes provides a lasting inspiration. See generally MICHAEL FORD, FATHER MYCHAEL JUDGE:
AN AUTHENTIC AMERICAN HERO (2002).
3. See infra Part I, pp. 7-8.
4. See infra Part I, p. 7.
5. See generally White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci. See also infra note 8.
6. See infra Part I, pp. 5-7.
7. See infra Part I, pp. 5-6.
[Vol. 35.3
Charitable Choice would acknowledge, its providers must be chosen based
on secular criteria.8  The policy imperative is respect, both of the non-
believer victim and of those non-religious volunteers who can bring
compassion and sensitivity to comforting others in their first moments of
loss.9 This is a spiritual task in the very broadest sense.
This Article proposes that three criteria should determine the
constitutionality of a given governmental relationship with chaplains or
clergy. First, the greater the situational burden on the recipient's religious
exercise, the greater the government latitude to accommodate by providing
access, to clergy or other religious personnel. Where the recipient is not
somehow restricted from access to his own clergy or religious activities,
any religious test for the provider of government-sponsored empathic or
counseling services is unconstitutional. Second, the state must be neutral,
including as between religion and non-religion, which precludes any
express or implied governmental suggestion that a religious response is
superior, or necessary, in the face of trauma. And third, any provision of
religious content facilitated by the government and justified as a matter of
private choice, must be wholly voluntary. This factor is less likely to be
satisfied where the arranged interaction is one-on-one between a religious
provider and a person made vulnerable by tragedy. The Crisis Chaplaincy
Model fails on all three levels: It is not a lawful accommodation and it
violates the endorsement and coercion tests.
Chaplains have become common in numerous institutions, including
the military, hospitals, and police and fire departments, and yet only a
handful of decisions, most more than twenty years old, have confronted the
constitutionality of government-provided chaplains.1 °  The issue has
resurfaced: The Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) recently
challenged the VA hospital system's chaplain program.I' This Article
8. "Charitable Choice" refers to the laws and regulations intended to encourage faith-based
organizations to obtain federal funding to provide social services. See generally Michele Estrin
Gilman, If At First You Don't Succeed, Sign an Executive Order: President Bush and the
Expansion of Charitable Choice, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1103 (2007); Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (2005).
9. As discussed infra, this affects a significant number of Americans, given that some 10-
20% identified themselves as nonreligious or refused to answer such questions in the most recent
census. See Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 1,
text accompanying n. 174 (2006) (citing U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical
Abstract of the U.S. 58 (125th ed. 2006) (Table No. 69)).
10. See infra Part II.
11. FFRF v. Nicholson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 609 (W.D. Wis. 2007), appeal docketed, No. 07-
1292 (7th Cir. 2007) (parties argued merits and issue of taxpayer standing in light of Hein v.
FFRF, 127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007) on January 17, 2008). If the case is dismissed on taxpayer standing
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provides a framework to guide analysis in those contexts and also fills a
gap in the legal scholarship. The commentary has addressed only the
military chaplaincy and its troubles with proselytizing chaplains and
denominational distinctions, which presents different issues from those
raised by pastoral counseling in the civilian world. 1
2
Part I will further explain the Crisis Chaplaincy Model, the use of
clergy in disaster response, and training and practice for chaplains. Part II
will set forth the existing case law on chaplain programs and the several
rationales courts have used to uphold them. Part III will review the
governing Supreme Court principles, including the endorsement and
coercion tests which, for the most part, were ignored by the chaplain cases.
This Part also will show why the Crisis Chaplaincy Model is
unconstitutional. Finally, Part IV will provide new guidelines for
evaluating all the other contexts in which government uses chaplains.
Part I. Government's Use of Chaplains for Those in Crisis
The troublesome aspects of the Crisis Chaplaincy Model can best be
appreciated by comparing Los Angeles' secular "Crisis Response Team"
with Seattle's "Community Chaplaincy."' 13  In both cities, the police
department contacts a trained volunteer to provide assistance in a wide
variety of tragedies, including homicides, suicides, drive-by shootings,
major traffic accidents, sexual assaults, and child death. The term "victim"
is used broadly here to mean not only the victim of the crime, if any, but
grounds, FFRF is likely to re-file on behalf of plaintiff harmed by the VA's promotion of religion
(based on author's telephone conversation with FFRF Director August 8th, 2007).
A second recent chaplaincy case, FFRF v. Roob (filed May 2, 2007, S.D. Ind.), which was an
Establishment Clause challenge to a novel paid position of chaplain for the State of Indiana's
Department of Health and Human Services, recently was dismissed after the State terminated the
disputed position. THE ROUNDTABLE E-NEWSLETTER (Aug. 21, 2007),
http://www.socialpolicyandreligion.org/newsletters/8-21-2007.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
12. See Richard D. Rosen, Katcoff v. Marsh at Twenty-Two: The Military Chaplaincy and
the Separation of Church and State, 38 U. TOL. L. REv. 1137 (2007) (only article discussing
constitutionality of chaplaincy, as well as specific issues of compulsion and nondiscrimination);
David E. Fitzkee & Linell A. Letendre, Religion in the Military: Navigating the Channel Between
the Religion Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REv. 1 (2007); William J. Doobosh, Jr., Coercion in the Ranks:
The Establishment Clause Implications of Chaplain-Led Prayers for Mandatory Army Events,
2006 Wis. L. REv. 1493 (2006); Kenneth J. Schweiker, Military Chaplains: Federally Funded
Fanaticism and the United States Air Force Academy, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 5 (2006);
Emilie Kraft Bindon, Entangled Choices: Selecting Chaplains for the United States Armed
Forces, 56 ALA. L. REv. 247 (2004).
13. See LAPD "Crisis Response Team Fact Sheet" [hereinafter LAPD Site],
http://www.lapdonline.org/getuinvolved/contentbasic view/23491 (last visited Aug. 2, 2007);
SPD Community Chaplaincy, http://www.spdcommunitychaplaincy.org/faq.html [hereinafter
Seattle CC Site] (last visited Aug. 2, 2007).
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any person traumatized by the tragedy, such as a witness, family member,
or those specified by the police as needing support. The volunteer strives
to arrive within twenty to thirty minutes to provide immediate, on-scene
help to the victims, including emotional support, practical assistance,
outreach to existing support systems (including family, friends and clergy,
as appropriate) and referral to other resources for long-term support. The
request is triggered by departmental policy and not by a victim's request
for such help. In addition, the volunteer serves as a liaison between the
victim and law enforcement and other emergency workers, thus freeing up
police and fire personnel from the "soft" tasks of consolation to enhance
attention to their primary roles.
14
The common purpose of this immediate crisis intervention is as
follows:
According to mental health experts, following a traumatic [e]vent,
crime or disaster, people may feel helpless, confused, and undergo
emotional shock. Victims' and families' experiences in the critical
hours immediately following a traumatic event strongly influence
how these tragedies will impact the rest of their lives. Those
receiving effective support are more likely to eventually resume
healthy and productive lives, while those who do not are at higher
risks of mental and physical health disorders. 15
The Los Angeles Crisis Response Team members are screened and
specially trained for this sensitive role. 16 L.A.'s program is similar to local
chapters of Trauma Intervention Programs, Inc., a national volunteer not-
for-profit, which trains volunteers of all backgrounds to assist emergency
personnel to help victims in crises.
17
Seattle's "Community Chaplaincy" program, however, includes an
additional component:' 8  community chaplains "must be formally
14. Id.
15. See supra note 13, LAPD Site.
16. Id. (LAPD volunteers receive over 48 hours of mandatory training). See also
http:///www.sandiego.gov/volunteer-program/opportunities/police.shtml (last visited Dec. 16,
2007) (a similar secular program in San Diego requires that crisis intervention volunteers have no
criminal record, communicate well with people, and complete a 100-hour training).
17. See Trauma Intervention Programs, Inc., Portland/Vancouver Chapter,
http://www.tipnw.org (last visited Dec. 16, 2007) (TIP, which began in 1985, now has programs
operating in Portland, Las Vegas, Atlanta, and many smaller municipalities).
18. See Law Enforcement Chaplaincy of Sacramento, http://www.sacchaplains.com (last
visited Jan. 14, 2008) (this organization appears to be the originator of this model, but the text
discusses the Seattle chaplaincy because Seattle's web site contains a more complete description;
Sacramento originally required its community chaplains to profess faith in Jesus Christ, a practice
it was forced to stop amidst controversy). See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Foundation,
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recommended by their own faith congregation."' 9 If they are laity rather
than ordained clergy, they must be laypersons "who are in leadership in
their 'faith group' as long as they remain under [its] authority."2 ° While
they are to provide "nonsectarian, nondiscriminatory support" to all and
asked not to proselytize, Seattle's web site states that, even though the
victims typically do not know the chaplain's particular religion, "the
spiritual dimension implicit in the chaplain's role is often profoundly
critical to preserving whatever 'seeds of hope' are left when people's lives
have been ravaged by the sudden death of a loved one.",21 This faith-based
approach to victim assistance has been supported financially by the United
States Department of Justice's Office of Victims of Crime, which has given
grants to the U.S. Community Chaplaincy, a not-for-profit organization that
assists local police departments in creating community chaplaincies.2
In preparing for and responding to disasters, the faith community's
role is more extensive, in both breadth and depth. Several examples
illustrate the work done to follow up on the post-9/1 1 groundswell of
volunteerism. New York Disaster Interfaith Services (NYDIS) provides
preparedness training to clergy, houses of worship, and other religious
organizations. It also serves the NYC Office of Emergency Management
as one of many agencies staffing the City's crisis command center, when
activated, and as the City's liaison with the faith community.23 The City of
Chicago has also worked with local clergy on disaster response training and
has integrated spiritual care into its disaster planning.24 Faith communities
are an integral part of municipal emergency preparedness, both as one type
of the local institutions relied on for communications and emergency social
http://www.ffrf.org/fttoday/2002/may02/ newsnotes.php, (which may account for its more muted
public face).
19. See supra note 13, Seattle CC Site.
20. See Seattle CC Site - Chaplains, http://www.spdcommunitychaplaincy.org/
chaplains.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
21. See supra note 13, Seattle CC Site (emphasis added).
22. See Office for Victims of Crime, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/help/
faithbasedmatrix.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008) (listing OVC-Funded Victim Services Grantee
Programs for Faith-Based Organizations); http://www.ovc.gov/publications/
infores/focuson2005/faithbased (last visited Jan. 14, 2008) (listing "U.S. Community Chaplaincy"
as a Topic-Specific OVC Initiative). Note that USCC has changed its name to U.S. Crisis Care
Network and works with secular crisis response organizations, as well as chaplaincies. See also
U.S. Crisis Care, http://www.crisishelp.us (last visited Jan. 14, 2008) (no longer discussing
religious test for volunteers; instead describing the volunteers' personal characteristics, which
include "genuine compassion for every human being, even those most unlike themselves.").
23. See New York Disaster Interfaith Services, http://www.nydis.org (last visited Jan. 14,
2008).
24. See Hyde Park Union Church, http://www.hpuc.org/HPUCHome.htm (last visited Jan.
14, 2008); see also infra at text accompanying notes 25-27.
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services, and as providers of spiritual care, especially where disaster
disrupts normal delivery systems for religious services.
The evacuation and resettlement of Katrina refugees called on these
newly developed capacities. One example is useful for comparing spiritual
care in the large-scale disaster versus the crime-victim context. The Fosco
Center, Chicago's intake and welcome center for Katrina refugees, offered
spiritual care along with a broad spectrum of assistance offered by the Red
Cross, the Heartland Alliance, the Salvation Army, and numerous city
agencies. 2' This response was readily mobilized based on emergency
preparedness work done post-9/11 by the City and the Council of Religious
Leaders of Metropolitan Chicago, a broad ecumenical group. The
volunteers, who included Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and
Buddhists, were required to provide proof that they were ordained clergy,
certified chaplains, or otherwise officially recognized by a religious body.
They received training, which included instruction not to proselytize,
background checks and detailed rules of conduct.26 They were able to
provide simple comfort or fill a religious role, solely upon request from
people bereft of all their own resources. Secular mental health counseling
services also were available within the large facility.27
One apparent reason for the growth of local Crisis Chaplaincy
programs is their synergy with clergy disaster response. For example, a
Baptist group known as Victim Relief Services began working in a local
role with the Dallas Police Department and, after participating in the 9/11
response, created Victim Chaplain and Counselor Association of America
(VCCAA), which trains ecclesiastically-endorsed persons to counsel crime
victims. 28 In addition, many of the Crisis Chaplaincies are closely tied to,
25. Cathleen Falsani, Evacuees Find Spiritual Solace; Chicago's ministers, priests,
counselors help victims here, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at 18.
26. Id.; see also "Spiritual Provider Agreement" (copy on file with author); Brian C.
Ryckman, Indoctrinating the Gulf Coast: The Federal Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW 929 (2007)
(discussing faith-based organizations responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita by housing and
feeding of refugees and the constitutionality of subsequent FEMA reimbursement).
27. Note that mental health services also have worked to prepare to counsel in disasters. See
generally DIANE MYERS & DAVID F. WEE, DISASTER IN MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: A PRIMER
FOR PRACTITIONERS (2005); ROBEN J. URANO, ED., TERRORISM AND DISASTER: INDIVIDUAL &
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH INTERVENTIONS (2003).
28. Victim Chaplain & Counselor Association of America, http://www.victimchaplains.org
(last viewed Jan. 14, 2008) (one requirement for participation in a VCCAA program is that a
"Victim Chaplain should be ecclesiastically certified in good standing with, and endorsed for
Chaplaincy by a recognized religious body."). Note that VCCAA is associated with Crisis
Chaplaincy Care, Inc., a division of The Faith Based Counselor Training Institute, Inc.
("counseling from a Biblical dynamic") (see http://www.faithbasedcounseling.com). Similarly,
USCC's curriculum recently expanded to include preparation for mass violence such as terrorism.
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or identical with, police or fire department chaplains programs.29
Organizations such as the International Conference of Police Chaplains
serve to organize and mobilize local police chaplains to serve in mass
disasters; the experience of counseling the public, in turn, can lead to an
expanded agenda at home. From the emergency preparedness perspective,
there is a clear benefit to maintaining a pool of chaplains who practice their
crisis counseling skills for the benefit of crime victims.
This Article focuses on the roles of chaplains sponsored by
government to counsel members of the public in crises of varying scale.
The issues of chaplains who counsel police and fire personnel and
government hospital patients will be analyzed secondarily, as part of
general proposed guidelines. At this point, before discussing the existing
case law on chaplains, it is worthwhile to introduce their terminology,
credentialing, and function.
A chaplain is a member of the clergy or a trained layperson who
provides religious services and spiritual counseling in an institutional
setting such as the military or hospitals. Typically, chaplain positions
require training in "clinical pastoral education" (CPE), interfaith supervised
work with persons in crisis, which emphasizes empathic listening and
responsiveness to the person's degree and type of religion.3° Usually, they
are certified by an organization representing their own faith tradition,31 but
some organizations certify chaplains based on the particular function
served, such as police or hospital chaplain.32 In addition, there is a related
certification as a "pastoral counselor," a newer tradition that affirmatively
29. See, e.g., Spokane Washington Police Department, http://www.spokanepolice.org
(search for "chaplain") (explaining that chaplains can serve needs of both police officers and
public); Santa Clara County Office of the Sheriff, http://www.sccgov.org/portal/site/sheriff/
(follow "Chaplaincy Program" hyperlink under "Administration"). See also International
Conference of Police Chaplains, http://www.icpc4cops.org (last visited Jan. 14, 2008); The
Federation of Fire Chaplains, http://www.firechaplains.org (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
30. The Association for Clinical Pastoral Education, Inc., http://www.acpe.edu (last visited
Jan. 14, 2008) (CPE credits are required for most chaplain positions).
31. The main certifying organizations are the Association of Professional Chaplains (a
Protestant Christian organization) (see http://www.professionalchaplains.org), the National
Association of Catholic Chaplains (see http://www.nacc.org), and the National Association of
Jewish Chaplains (see http://www.najc.org).
32. These credentialing authorities include the International Conference of Police Chaplains
(see http://www.icpc4cops.org) (last visited Jan. 14, 2008) and the Healthcare Chaplains Ministry
Association (see http://www.hcmachaplains.org) (last visited Jan. 14, 2008), and the newer
emergency-focused Crisis Chaplaincy Care, Inc.
(http://www.faithbasedcounseling.com/crisis.htm) (last visited Jan. 14, 2008); see generally
DAVID W. DEREVERE ET AL., CHAPLAINCY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT: WHAT IT IS AND How To
Do IT (1989); MARK COBBS, THE HOSPITAL CHAPLAIN'S HANDBOOK (2005); Lawrence E. Holt,
ed., HOSPITAL MINISTRY (1985).
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integrates psychology and spirituality. 33 All available certifications appear
to require ecclesiastical endorsement, which is an official statement from
the governing body of an established religious organization or
denomination that the individual is in good standing with that body and
qualified to serve as its representative.34
Part II. The Chaplaincy Cases
The single Supreme Court chaplain opinion, Marsh v. Chambers,
upheld Nebraska's long-term use of a paid chaplain to open state legislative
sessions with a prayer.35 This particular form of "ceremonial deism" was
permitted in light of Congress' unbroken tradition of such prayer, including
while adopting the First Amendment.36 It thus offers little guidance here,
in a relatively novel context that is highly interactive rather than passively
ritualistic.
There are only a handful of cases challenging government
chaplaincies. While they could be categorized easily by type-military,
hospital, police-that would not bring to light the obscured but essential
point that these cases are based on two completely different rationales. The
military chaplaincy is based on accommodation; there, the government
purposely, and unabashedly, provides religious services. The remaining
cases focus on governments' use of religious personnel to perform
primarily secular counseling for purposes of holistic health. This second
33. The American Association of Pastoral Counselors trains and certifies pastoral
counselors. (See http://www.aapc.org). See generally DAVID G. BENNER, STRATEGIC PASTORAL
COUNSELING: A SHORT-TERM STRUCTURED MODEL (1992).
34. See Bindon, supra note 12 (discussing general requirement of ecclesiastical endorsement
in context of military chaplaincies).
35. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-95 (1983).
36. Id. at 788. The term "ceremonial deism" was coined by then Yale Law School Dean,
Eugene Rostow, and has been used by Justice O'Connor. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring generally to minimally
religious practices deemed to be merely ritual through long customary usage). See Mark Strasser,
Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement, and the Marsh Wild Card, 40 IND. L. REV.
529 (2007); Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 2083 (1996); Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 381 (6th Cir. 1999) (calling
Marsh's allowance of state-sponsored prayer "one-of-a-kind"). See also Newdow v. Bush, 355 F.
Supp. 2d 265 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding clergy-led prayer during presidential inauguration within
Marsh exception because inaugural prayer also practiced at Nation's founding); Mellen v.
Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) (Marsh inapplicable to supper prayer at state-operated
military college held unconstitutional because public universities and military colleges did not
exist when the Bill of Rights was adopted); Doe v. Village of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476, 1479
(7th Cir. 1990) (saying of Marsh, "When the Court held that a state legislature may open with
prayer, it did so because of the deep roots of the practice, not because prayer in the context of
legislation is secular.").
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rationale requires a more layered analysis to understand and evaluate. This
Part II provides a description and some initial critique of these few cases.
A. Government-Provided Clergy and the Accommodation Principle
In the well-known case of Katcoffv, Marsh, the Second Circuit upheld
the extensive chaplaincy system of the United States Army, primarily to
protect the free exercise rights of the armed forces.37 Many military
personnel and their families are stationed internationally or in rural areas
where the local clergy are insufficient in number and diversity to meet the
troops' religious needs, and unpredictable deployment and severe stress are
part of army life. The challenge was to the public funding of the very
extensive program that seeks to replicate the diversity of religious
experience in civilian life, which at that time, included more than 500
chapels and 100 Religious Educational Facilities.38
The court began by acknowledging that, viewed in isolation, the
program violates the often criticized Lemon test, which remains the starting
point of much Establishment Clause analysis. 39 This test asks whether (1)
there is a secular purpose, (2) the government action has a primary effect of
advancing (or inhibiting) religion, and (3) it leads to "excessive
entanglement" between church and state.4n
The court found that most of the religious worship, education, and
counseling provided to army personnel and their families was done in
circumstances where otherwise, as a practical matter, the practice of their
religion would be substantially unavailable. Bolstered by the chaplaincy's
deep historical roots, going back to the Continental Army, and the
deference due congressional action under the War Powers Clause, the
37. Katcoffv. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
38. Id. at 229.
39. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is
Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L.REV. 795 (1993). But see, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S.
844 (2005) (finding a Ten Commandments display unconstitutional and showing that the Lemon
test remains a predominant structural approach in Establishment Clause cases).
40. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-12. Also, in Katcoff, the Second Circuit found that
administration of the program, which involves hiring and choosing among denominations, at a
minimum entangles the government with religious accrediting bodies. 755 F.2d at 232. This
entanglement causes very real, predictable problems, as shown by the recent spate of litigation
claiming denominational discrimination. See, e.g., Larson v. United States Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d
11 (D.D.C. 2007) (rejected applicants, all non-liturgical Protestant ministers, challenged the
Navy's chaplaincy program, alleging that Navy denominational quotas do not sufficiently reflect
the number of adherents in the Navy); In re England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (non-




program met "the more appropriate standard of relevancy to our national
defense and reasonable necessity.'
The Second Circuit, however, questioned the constitutionality of
government-funded chaplains in large urban areas, where military
personnel "commute daily to their homes and spend their free hours
(including weekends) in locations where civilian clergy and facilities are
just as available to them as to other non-military civilians. 42  Where
religious exercise is not burdened, another constitutional justification is
required. For the military, the court asked on remand whether this practice
is reasonably necessary for purposes of national defense. The case was
dismissed before further judicial analysis, so the issue remains unresolved.
Possible institutional reasons for an urban military chaplaincy include the
need to station chaplains in cities to conduct military funerals and to handle
the program's administration and maintenance of morale by rewarding
chaplains with more desirable postings.43
The Supreme Court expressly approved of the Second Circuit's
accommodation opinion more recently in Cutter v. Wilkinson.4 There, the
Court reaffirmed that the Establishment Clause allows government to
provide special accommodation for religious needs, where doing so is
necessary to alleviate "exceptional government-created burdens on private
religious exercise," so long as others are not unduly burdened and the
accommodation is administered neutrally among different faiths.45
In Cutter, a unanimous Court upheld Section Three of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), which
imposes strict scrutiny on governmental burdens on the religious exercise
of institutionalized persons such as prisoners. Privileging religious
exercise beyond the neutral treatment that now generally satisfies the Free
Exercise Clause is permitted under the Establishment Clause; the reason is
that where a person is institutionalized, the government exerts a degree of
control over his life that is not found in civilian society. In such contexts,
private religious expression is completely dependent on assistance from the
government.46
41. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 237. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
42. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 237-38.
43. Id. at 238-39 (Meskill, J., dissenting). See also Rosen, supra note 12, and text
accompanying nn.76-80 (discussing issue and referencing related army regulations).
44. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
45. Id. at 722 (citing Katcoffwith approval).
46. Id. at 721. Prior to enacting RLUIPA, Congress held three years of hearings
documenting barriers to religious exercise for institutionalized religious persons. Id. at 716.
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Cutter's rationale supports the constitutionality of establishing some
form of chaplain programs in prisons, psychiatric hospitals and other
institutions where residents experience restricted movement and little
freedom.47 Similarly, after Cutter, the military chaplaincy (or at least those
aspects that can be shown necessary to remove a severe burden on religious
exercise) is no longer subject to any real challenge.
Thus, the accommodation principle reflected in military and prison
chaplaincies provides one constitutional mode-as this Article will argue,
the only defensible reason-for government deliberately and affirmatively
to provide a chaplain for the purpose of providing religious services.
Where government is actively involved in reproducing the religious
experience found in the community for a given population, the relevant
question is how severe is the contextual restriction on religious exercise.48
Under this analysis, the disaster chaplain passes, while the crime-victim
chaplain fails.
Applying this principle to the crisis and disaster contexts requires a
principled extension of existing doctrine because the Court has only
expressly permitted accommodation to alleviate government-imposed
burdens. In Cutter, the burden was confinement in a government prison
based on application of the criminal laws. In Corporation of the Presiding
RLUIPA is one of Congress's efforts to provide additional protection for religious exercise
following the Supreme Court's Smith decision, which held that the Free Exercise Clause is not
violated by enforcement of general, neutral laws that incidentally burden religious conduct. See
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that
the Free Exercise Clause did not bar Oregon from enforcing drug laws against Native Americans'
religious use of peyote). Following Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., which imposed strict scrutiny on all federal and state
law, and was held unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments in City of Boeme v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Many states enacted their own RFRA statutes, which this author has
argued are overly broad. See Mary Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Why RFRA 's Don't Work, 31 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 153 (2000).
47. See generally articles cited supra note 12. One of the factual allegations in Cutter (not
addressed in this facial challenge) concerned a prison's failure to provide chaplains trained in
plaintiffs' non-traditional religions, which included Wiccan and Satanism, while providing
chaplains for traditional religionists. How extensive and diverse such a prison chaplaincy need be
to satisfy RLUIPA is a different issue from the general permissibility of state-provided prison
chaplains.
48. The remaining, narrow category of cases involving government-facilitated chaplains is
that of the airport chaplain. They have been approved by implication in the few challenges to the
chapel facilities, with one court briefly referencing the underlying accommodation rationale. See
Hawley v. City of Cleveland, 24 F.3d 814 (6th Cir. 1994) (airport chapel built and run by
Catholic Archdiocese, open to all, but only providing Catholic services; below-market lease
constitutional, where free rent to Traveler's Aid and USO and chapel needed to accommodate
travelers' religious needs); Brashich v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 484 F. Supp.
697 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (allowing Catholic, Protestant and Jewish chapels at JFK Airport where
funded by the religious organizations and opportunity offered to all faiths).
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Bishop v. Amos, the other leading Supreme Court accommodation case, the
burden was a federal law prohibiting employers from considering religious
affiliation in hiring, which arguably interfered with churches' ability to
carry out their religious mission through their not-for-profit community
activities. 49 And as noted in Katcoff once a person enters the military, the
government controls many aspects of life and it is the residential situation
imposed by the government that creates the burden.
In the disaster scenario, government does not create the burden.
Instead, the deprivation of access to religious practices and personnel
results from the source of the disaster, whether flood, terrorist attack or
contagious disease epidemic. When a crisis has reached the point where
government is attempting to provide replacement religious services,
however, the state has become a caretaker for the disaster's victims. Where
the government has assumed a protective role, it is in the best position to
lift the burden and assist the victims by seeking to replicate their own
community religious practices, even if religious exercise has been burdened
by circumstances and not government action. Thus, in situations such as
the Fosco Center for Katrina refugees, the City's providing access to clergy
of many denominations should be viewed as defensible accommodation.
Accommodation, however, does not function to permit the
government to send a chaplain to address everyday tragedy. The family
and witnesses affected by an untimely death, while suffering emotionally,
do not suffer any significant burden on their religious activity. On the
scene following an accident or homicide, or at home receiving a death
notification, the person is only a phone call away from her clergy. Without
such a burden, there is no defensible religious accommodation need for a
government-sponsored crisis counselor to be a chaplain, ready to respond
immediately in a religious manner. Some victims will have no previous
religious affiliation or leanings. Where a municipality furnishes a chaplain
for those persons (drawing on the distinction made in Amos), there is an
unconstitutional primary effect because "the government itself has
advanced religion through its own activities and influences. ''5 ° Crossing
that line violates the Establishment Clause for "accommodation is not a
principle without limits."'"
49. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987).
50. Id. at 337.
51. Bd. ofEduc., Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 697, 706 (1994).
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B. Government-Provided Counselors, Holistic Health and Choice
In the several cases upholding government chaplaincies in the hospital
or police context (including one similar to the Crisis Chaplaincy Model) the
courts all explicitly eschew reliance on the accommodation rationale set
forth above. Rather, these opinions focus on the nature of the "pastoral
counseling" model employed, approving of the CPE approach, and its non-
sectarian, non-proselytizing, non-intrusive ways, while glossing over the
requirement that its practitioners be ecclesiastically endorsed. These courts
reason that providing mostly secular counseling for purposes of holistic
health is a secular purpose, and that there is no unconstitutional primary
effect because the recipient chooses any religious content. As shown
below, their shared analysis (1) does not squarely confront the issue of
government imposing a religious test and (2) wrongly conflates several
Establishment Clause paradigms.
1. Government Hospital Chaplaincies
Shortly after Katcoff, the Eighth Circuit broadly approved of a county
hospital chaplaincy in Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center.52 The district
court had approved of only a subset of the program-the provision of
religious services to the hospital's prisoner and psychiatric population-as
a permissible accommodation under Amos. 53 However, the Eighth Circuit
held that there was a valid secular purpose for the whole program (which
included the religious counseling of outpatients and families): improving
the patient's health and well-being by attending to spiritual and emotional
needs affecting bodily health.54 There, the chaplain was a United Church
of Christ deacon, trained in CPE. Her duties included calling on patients,
whether or not they had requested to see a chaplain, providing counseling
to all, with the patient directing any religious content in the conversations,
as well as conducting worship services and administering the sacrament of
communion. 5  The Eighth Circuit also held that the chaplaincy did not
violate the "effects" prong of the Lemon test because of the chaplain's
neutral approach and because there was no link to a particular
denomination.56 The only restriction imposed was on the chaplain's
52. Carter v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988).
53. Id. at 457.
54. Id. at451,454.
55. Id. at 451, 455. The Eighth Circuit expressly stated that accommodation was not its
rationale. Id. at 457.
56. Id. at 456 (comparing to Baptist-only police chaplain in Voswinkel. See infra Part II.B.2.
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religious counseling of hospital employees because that counseling
typically focused on problems other than the patients' illnesses.57
The current litigation challenging the Veterans Administration's
chaplaincy, FFRF v. Nicholson, builds and expands on the reasoning of
Carter.58 The district court decision explained that in the past, the VA
chaplain's, role was primarily sacramental, but the focus is now on
addressing the spiritual dimensions of health. 59 Like the Eighth Circuit
opinion it followed, the Nicholson court emphasized the non-sectarian,
non-proselytizing nature of the CPE-trained VA chaplains, but also painted
a more detailed picture. Chaplains are trained to "encourage helpful
religious and spiritual coping processes. 60  Counseling on existential
issues like the meaning of life, illness, and death is provided to both
religious and non-religious patients.61 All the chaplains who provide such
services, however, are necessarily approved practitioners of a specific
organized religion. The opinion acknowledged that, as in most hospitals,
VA chaplains must be ecclesiastically endorsed by their faith tradition.62
The FFRF did not challenge the provision of such services to
hospitalized patients, whose mobility is restricted, but asserted that the VA
crossed the line by providing such religious services to outpatients and by
vigorously promoting religion over non-religion. One example of this
alleged excess was a sample "spiritual assessment" (an in-depth analysis of
a patient's spiritual beliefs), which goes beyond the regular admission form
screening for special religious needs such as dietary restrictions or
communion delivery.63 The court approved the process because some level
of inquiry into a patient's spiritual needs and preferences is required by the
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO, the hospital accrediting agency), at least for patients with end-of-
life, long-term care and substance abuse issues. One sample illustrated the
grounds for FFRF's concerns. It included extensive, detailed questions
such as how often the patient attends church, and the VA's written
statement: "We believe that faith plays an important role in a person's
sense of health and wellness." 64 While not mentioned in the Nicholson
57. Carter, 857 F.2d at 457.
58. FFRF v. Nicholson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 609 (W.D.Wis. 2007). See also note 11 and
accompanying text).
59. Id. at 612.
60. Id. at 613.
61. Id. at 621.
62. Id. at 612.
63. Id. at 613.
64. Id. at 614.
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opinion, the relevant JCAHO standards focus on patients receiving care
that respects their personal values and spiritual preferences, and the
spirituality inquiry is part of a broad-based assessment of patients' social,
emotional, and cultural needs.65
Nicholson echoed Carter's finding that promoting "holistic health
care" is the valid secular purpose of providing government hospital
chaplains. The district court took it a step further by accepting the VA's
claim that "research shows" that access to spiritual and pastoral care
improves health, reduces hospital admissions, and thus saves costs.
66
A closer look at independent research done for this Article, however,
undermines the strength of that claim. The positive impact of religion and
spirituality on physical health, while a subject of frequent study in recent
years, is far from settled.67 Much of the correlation for church-going and
health, for example, can be explained as relating to coexisting variables
such as social support, improved health behaviors and compassionate
personality.68 Several studies support the proposition that patients benefit
from the opportunity to discuss "meaning in life" issues without regard to
the religious identity of the provider.69 The strongest proven link, in fact, is
between the practice of "transcendental meditation" (T.M.), a non-
65. See The Joint Commission 2007 Requirements Related to the Provision of Culturally
and Linguistically Appropriate Health Care (May 2007),
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/1401C2EF-62F0-4715-B28A-
7CE7FOF2OE2D/O/hlcjc-stds.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2008) [hereinafter "JCAHO Standards"].
66. Nicholson, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
67. See, e.g., Carl E. Thoresen & Alex H. S. Harris, Spirituality and Health: What's the
Evidence and What's Needed?, 24 ANNALS OF BEHAV. MED. 3 (2002) (relation between
religion/spirituality and physical health "appears far more complex and modest than some
contend," and which factors are relevant "remains unclear"); Richard P. Sloan & Emilia Bagiella,
Claims about Religious Involvement and Health Outcomes, 24 ANNALS OF BEHAV. MED. 14
(2002) (meta-analysis hundreds of articles on topic concluded that among the relevant studies,
"many either had methodological flaws or were misrepresented, leaving only a few articles that
could truly be described as demonstrating beneficial effects of religious involvement").
68. See, e.g., Doug Orman & Carl E. Thorson, "Does Religion Cause Health? ": Diverse
Interpretations and Diverse Meanings, 7 J. OF HEALTH PSYCHOL., 365 (2002); Patrick R. Steffen
& Kevin S. Masters, Does Compassion Mediate the Intrinsic Religion-Health Relationship?, 30
ANNALS OF BEHAV. MED. 217 (2005).
69. See, e.g., Timothy P. Daaleman et al., Religion, Spirituality, and Health Status in
Geriatric Patients, 2 ANNALS OF FAM. MED. 49 (2004) (concluding that geriatric patients who
report greater spirituality, but not greater religiosity, are more likely to report good health);
Michael F. Steger & Patricia Frazier, Meaning in Life: One Link in the Chain from Religiousness
to Well-Being, 54 J. OF COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 574 (2005) (benefit from discussing ultimate
issue in terms of "meaning in life" gained even with persons with differing perspectives on
religion).
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organized, non-theistic potentially spiritual practice, and health.7° It does
not appear that an experienced teacher of T.M. would be able to secure a
position as a VA hospital chaplain.
Finally, the Nicholson court held that the VA hospital chaplaincy does
not have an unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion because
the patient is free to indicate his refusal of pastoral counseling or the
spiritual assessment. The judge saw no issue of coercion on the grounds
that the patients are adults, not "young impressionable students," referring
to Supreme Court cases in the school prayer context, discussed in Part 111.71
As discussed, Nicholson did not rely on the accommodation principle
because the FFRF's challenge involved chaplain services to outpatients.
While not mentioned by the district court, however, an earlier Seventh
Circuit case involving the VA hospital chaplaincy identified an alternative
accommodation rationale that could arguably be extended to encompass
outpatients' rights and should be mentioned here. In Baz v. Walters, while
dismissing the claims of a fired chaplain whose evangelical style
undermined his therapeutic role, the court noted that if the VA did not
provide a hospital chaplaincy program, it would force veterans to choose
between the free medical care earned by their military service and going
elsewhere to freely exercise their religion while in the hospital.72 This
rationale could arguably be used to support furnishing everyone in the VA
system with whatever degree of religious and spiritual counseling has
become the standard in private hospitals, at least those without an express
evangelical mission. This line of reasoning will be addressed in Part IV,
which provides guidelines for analysis of all types of government
chaplaincies. The next portion of this section will present the remaining
chaplain cases that are based on the secular purpose/no primary effect
rationale.
2. Police Chaplains and the Crisis Chaplaincy
Despite their prevalence, only one published decision addresses a
constitutional challenge to the "internal" police chaplaincy, in which a
chaplain counsels police department employees on their unique stressors.
70. See Teresa E. Seeman, et al., Religiosity/Spirituality and Health: A Critical Review of
the Evidence for Biological Connection, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 53 (2003) (finding supportive
evidence linking religiosity/spirituality to physiological processes, concluding that "the strongest
evidence comes from interventional trials reporting the beneficial physiological impact of
meditation (transcendental meditation)").
71. Nicholson, 469 F. Supp. at 621 (construing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) as
limited to school children).
72. Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 709 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Katcoffv. Marsh, 755 F.2d
223 (2d Cir. 1985)).
Spring 20081 CHAPLAINS AND CRISIS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Voswinkel v. City of Charlotte involved a Baptist chaplain who provided
primarily secular counseling and did not engage in proselytizing.73 Similar
to the Second Circuit's concern over the role of military chaplains in large
cities, the district court in Voskwinkel questioned the defensibility of any
police chaplaincy on the grounds that police officers are wholly able to
meet their religious needs without government assistance. 4  The case
turned, however, on the unlawful agreement between the city and a Baptist
church to provide a full-time police chaplain, which the court held imposed
an unconstitutional religious test and created the appearance of
favoritism.
75
The other chaplaincy cases have pointed to Voswinkel as support that
government chaplain programs are allowed so long as they are non-
sectarian. The final piece of the chaplaincy case law picture is a
Washington Supreme Court decision essentially upholding the Crisis
Chaplaincy Model. Malyon v. Pierce County involved a sheriffs
department contract with the Tacoma-Pierce County Chaplaincy (TPCC), a
non-profit Christian ministry, to provide death notification and twenty-
four-hour crisis counseling for victims of major crimes.76 TPCC requires
its members to be credentialed pastors of local congregations; fourteen of
the fifteen volunteers in the Pierce County program were Christian.77
While the chaplains were unpaid volunteers, the County provided some
material support, including the use of police radios, liability insurance, and
sheriff's jackets for identification purposes. 78  From the public's
perspective, these chaplains effectively were a part of the Pierce County
law enforcement response team.
The Washington court found the hospital chaplain context analogous
and followed the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Carter. It held that the mostly
secular counseling, provided to people of all religions and none, satisfied
the Lemon test.79 As in Carter, the opinion stated there was no religious
test for the position because the chaplains came from various
denominations. In addition, no religious test was imposed by the
government, the court found, because TPCC was "neutrally chosen through
73. Voswinkel v. City of Charlotte, 495 F. Supp. 588 (W.D.N.C. 1980).
74. Id. at 597; compare Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988)
(court approved of the county-funded chaplain providing secular counseling to hospital
employees, but noted that any religious counseling of that group would cross the line).
75. Id. at 595-96.
76. Malyon v. Pierce County, 935 P.2d 1272 (Wash. 1997).
77. Id. at 1275.
78. Id. at 1275, 1277.
79. Id. at 1288.
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a bidding process open to all."'80 While the sheriffs department did issue a
bid request and TPCC was the sole respondent, this was done at the
expiration of a seven-year contract with TPCC, seeking an organization
with at least ten volunteers "qualified and ready to serve" the County's
crisis intervention needs.
8 1
3. Introductory Analysis of the Non-Accommodation-Based Chaplaincy Cases
As described above, there are two distinct categories of chaplaincy
cases. First, government necessarily imposes a religious test when it
selects and provides chaplains to accommodate otherwise unmet religious
exercise needs Indeed, it is involved in the challenging task-the essence
of "entanglement"--of selecting which denominations should be
represented, in what proportion, and whether a given candidate has the
proper credentials to represent his denomination. This unusual, and
typically unconstitutional, role is accepted by the courts in the name of
protecting religious freedoms. As described, where the government's
purpose is accommodation, the relevant question is how closely the facts of
the restriction on religious exercise resemble those found in the military or
prison life.
Second are contexts lacking such tangible, situational deprivations as
justification for government-provided chaplains. As discussed, the courts
upholding hospital chaplain services for outpatients and crisis chaplains for
crime victims did not pretend to rely on those recipients' restricted
movement. Instead, they first found a valid secular purpose in promoting
holistic health. For the sick, the goal is improving physical health. For the
crisis victims, the goal generally translates as preserving mental health and
thus quality of life. In both cases, the means are government provision of
religious personnel to provide comfort and counseling, of the secular,
religious, and spiritual type, with a special focus on issues involving of life
and death. Second, these courts held that there is no unconstitutional
"primary effect" because any religious talk in response to the presence of a
government-provided religious figure is the recipient's private, voluntary
choice. Thus, the argument goes, the government is not advancing religion
because the chaplains it provides do either secular or religious counseling,
upon request, so that the circuit is broken by individual choice.
This argument, however, wrongly conflates the direct and the indirect
paradigms governing Establishment Clause limitations on government aid
80. Id. at 1287.
81. TPCC provides similar chaplaincy services to ten other Washington State and municipal
agencies. Id. at 1277.
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to religious organizations. Before turning to the applicable Supreme Court
cases and tests, it may be helpful to provide a more parallel analogy.
Suppose a city administration wanted to turn its policy focus to the hard-
core unemployed, and the mayor believed strongly that only a
"transformational" model, in which participants turn to God to change their
lives, can reach this intractable target population. So the city selects a
group, "Faith Works," which approaches social problems from a faith-
based perspective and requires its volunteers to have a personal relationship
with God. With a nod to the Establishment Clause, but believing its limits
quite diluted given the reconstituted Court and the White House Faith-
Based Initiative, the city establishes certain program rules. The volunteers,
who refer to themselves as "disciples," are to provide one-on-one
mentoring and encouragement to program recipients, but are prohibited
from discussing religion unless asked by one of the unemployed persons.
The group will not be paid, but will be given use of city office space, some
equipment, and will be referred clients by and meet regularly with the
city's workforce development agency to review policy and coordinate
efforts.
With this picture in mind, along with the courts' stated rationales, we
now turn to Part III, which sets forth the Supreme Court standards that
would be applied to any constitutional challenge to the Crisis Chaplaincy
Model. Because the rationale used in Carter, Nicholson, and Malyon is
more complex and multi-layered than that used in Katcoff, review of these
Supreme Court cases is required before any further unpacking of their
analysis. Part III also will show how these precedents would apply to the
government's use of clergy in disaster response; while that practice would
likely be analyzed primarily as a permissible accommodation, looking at
the two contexts provides a useful foil.
Part Il. Supreme Court Tests and Concern
for the Non-Religious
Much has been written about the incoherent, confusing state of the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the intractable
dissension in the Court, and its shifting, unpredictable standards.82 One
recent commentator identified ten different approaches that have been used
82. See, e.g., Jay A. Sekulow & Francis J. Manion, The Supreme Court and the Ten
Commandments: Compounding the Establishment Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 33 (2005); William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It, " The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S.CAL. L.REv. 495 (1986).
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by at least one justice,83 and valuable effort has been expended lining up
the individual justices' votes on various tests in specific contexts in order to
predict future outcomes. 84 There have been seismic changes in how the
Establishment Clause is interpreted, with increasing leeway for government
to partner with religious organizations for social service purposes, as well
as expanding acceptance of government's favorable acknowledgment of
the country's religious history and majority affiliations. Many have
expressed well-grounded concern about the expected continued march in
these directions.
85
That said, under current law, there are several tests to which the courts
would turn, selecting one or more to evaluate the crisis chaplaincies. For
the most part, government neutrality toward religion is an essential
illuminating value in the Establishment Clause cases. Courts still usually,
though not always, employ the modified Lemon/Agostini test, looking for a
secular purpose with an increasingly generous eye, and more easily finding
that the primary effect of the government's actions is that the government
has not advanced religion.86 The endorsement test, which asks whether a
reasonable person would view the challenged action as the government
favoring religion, remains viable.87 The core Establishment Clause value
that the government may not use its awesome power to coerce religious
conduct is agreed on by all, with significant disputes about whether
coercion requires a threat of penalty or something less than wholly
voluntary participation.88 Given the extent to which the Crisis Chaplaincy
Model violates the Establishment Clause, however, resolving the
83. Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 725 (2006).
84. See, e.g., Christopher B. Harwood, Evaluating the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence in the Wake of Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU, 71
Mo. L. REv. 317 (2006).
85. See Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 1097 (2006)
(attacking historical support for Justice Scalia's originalist argument that the Establishment
Clause allows government to favor Judeo-Christian religions); Garrett Epps, Some Animals are
More Equal Than Others: The Rehnquist Court and "Majority Religion, " 21 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 323 (2006); but see L. Scott Smith, From Promised Land to Tower of Babel: Religious
Pluralism and the Future of the Liberal Experiment in America, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 527 (2007)
(criticizing neutrality as unworkable and calling for government to advance traditional Judeo-
Christian values).
86. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (essentially dispensed with "excessive
entanglement" as a separate prong of the test, instead folding it in as one aspect of the "primary
effect" prong).
87. See infra Part III.C.
88. See infra Part III.D.
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differences surrounding these tests has less urgency here than it otherwise
might, especially given the speculative nature of that task.
This Part will first look at government's newly enhanced ability to
treat religious and secular organizations similarly in sharing government
assets. As shown below, this religion-blind requirement has been permitted
solely where the government is contracting with a number of entities,
religious and secular, as part of a broad neutral scheme. Next, this Part will
view the government's provision of a crisis chaplain from the recipient's
perspective and evaluate whether and when doing so constitutes
unconstitutional endorsement or coercion.
A. Neutrality, Primary Effect, and Religious Criteria
Neutrality has increasingly become the touchstone of the First
Amendment. It is "a principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause, that
government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to
irreligion. '' 89 There is scholarly and judicial debate about the nature of
neutrality, whether religion should enjoy a favored status in some contexts
and whether neutrality should bend to preserve civic values. 90 Still, under
the Court's current approach to government aid programs as reflected in
Mitchell v. Helms, neutrality is a necessary (and to that plurality, a
sufficient) condition. 91 As this section will show, the Court's current
precedent does not support, and likely prohibits, a local government's
creating a unique partnership with a religious organization for providing a
social service where there are no other secular partners.
Mitchell upheld a federal program in which state and local agencies
loaned material and equipment to schools, including parochial ones. The
case turned on the constitutionality of giving computers (which have no
fixed content and can be used for religious purposes) to religious
elementary schools, which long had been categorized as "pervasively
sectarian. 92 Except in the accommodation context, direct government aid
89. Bd. ofEduc., Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994).
90. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Religious Freedom and "Accommodationist Neutrality": A
Non-Neutral Critique, 84 OR. L. REv. 935 (2005) (asserting that neutrality is insufficient to
preserve liberal civic values); Robin Charlow, The Elusive Meaning of Religious Equality, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 1529 (2005) (exploring widespread disagreement over meaning of religious
equality); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990).
Justice Breyer, author of the controlling concurrence in Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2868
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring), reiterated that the Establishment Clause requires governmental
neutrality between religion and irreligion.
91. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
92. Id. at 840.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 35.3
is deemed to have an unconstitutional "primary effect" of advancing
religion if it is used for religious purposes. Prior to Mitchell, that test was
violated automatically where such aid flowed directly to a pervasively
sectarian organization.93
Justice O'Connor's controlling concurrence declared that the state
may give even divertible assets to core religious organizations, when done
as part of a broad neutral program also benefiting secular organizations, so
long as there are enforceable promises to use those assets exclusively for
secular purposes.94 Note that the Establishment Clause requirement that a
religious organization benefiting from government support be one among
many in a broad neutral program is a long-standing requirement.95 Mitchell
is discussed here because it is the Court's most recent pronouncement in
this area, and it expanded the landscape of the types of religious
organizations that are eligible for government programs. Even Justice
Thomas' plurality opinion in Mitchell acknowledged that satisfying the
Court's precedential "primary effect" test requires that government "not
define its recipients by reference to religion."
96
At least under current law, actual diversion (i.e., use of government
aid for religious purposes) has been approved by the Court only in true
private choice "indirect aid" cases. 97 These indirect aid cases include
93. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (defining "pervasively sectarian" as
institutions, such as churches and parochial elementary schools, where religion is so pervasive
that "a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission").
94. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 843. "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices, 'the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds."' Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188,193 (1977).
95. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (allowing religiously-affiliated
organization to participate in government counseling program because it was a broad neutral
program, involving secular organizations as well). The Court's tax subsidy cases confirm that
government cannot give a benefit exclusively to religious entities, although doing so is
permissible when provided on a broad neutral basis, such as to all not-for-profit charitable
organizations. Compare Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (exempting only
religious periodicals from state sales tax unconstitutional) with Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970) (upholding tax exemptions for religious organizations as part of broad, neutral
exemptions for charitable non-profits).
While distinguishable on numerous bases, the public forum free speech cases also support the rise
of neutrality as a governing principle for Establishment Clause considerations. See Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (extending line of cases requiring equal access for
religious speech in public forums to religious clubs using public school space after school). In
these cases, government entities refused access to religious groups on grounds of compliance with
the Establishment Clause, and the Court held that this was viewpoint discrimination in violation
of the Free Speech Clause.
96. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 822 (plurality opinion).
97. Id. at 840 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
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Zobrest (where the state did not violate the Establishment Clause by
providing an interpreter for a deaf child who chose to attend a parochial
high school because the state provided interpreters for all deaf children),98
and Witters (holding that state-provided tuition assistance for blind students
can be used to attend a Christian college for religious training). 99
Where government aid flows to a religious purpose solely through
private choice, it has been upheld even where the vast majority of choices
were religiously affiliated, as in the ground-breaking school voucher
decision, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.100  Even in Zelman, however,
eighteen percent of the private schools at which families could use the
vouchers were secular. Finally, the outer limits of the indirect aid
paradigm are shown in FFRF v. McCallum, where the Seventh Circuit
allowed the state to skip the "intermediate step" of providing a paper
voucher. 10' That case allowed the state to contract directly with a faith-
based halfway house, which had religious programming, because it was
one among several choices (the rest of them secular) and any payment to
them was based on the parolee's individual choice.
10 2
One might argue that the Crisis Chaplaincy Model should not be
evaluated under the government-aid rubric because the volunteer chaplain
organizations are assisting the government, and they are not paid
government funds, but that point does not change the analysis. First,
Mitchell itself involved the loan of equipment and materials and not grant
funds. Most chaplaincies receive some sort of tangible assets from the
government, such as office space or vehicles or, as in Malyon, the use of
police radios, sheriffs jackets and liability insurance. Second, the same
argument-that the religious organization is not truly receiving government
aid because it is helping the government by participating in the program-
could be made in most similar cases. The fact that there is a secular
purpose requirement, and that the government has decided to provide assets
or dollars for a neutral program, means that the delegate agency is
performing some task that the government wants done--one that the
government often is performing itself in some form. It is typical for the
98. Zobrest v. Catlina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
99. Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). The Court recently
established, however, in the controversial decision of Locke v. Davey, that while such indirect aid
is permitted by the Establishment Clause, a state's choice to restrict such a religious use of its aid
funds does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
(upholding Washington college financial aid program that excluded state payment for religious
ministry degrees).
100. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
101. FFRF v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003).
102. Id. at 882.
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private and public entities to be working together, in concert, to achieve an
important social service, or for a former government function to be
privatized in whole or in part.
Moreover, government conferral of a special status or unique
relationship on a religious organization can alone violate the Establishment
Clause. In Kiryas Joel, the Court struck down New York's creation of a
special school district for an Orthodox Hasidic Jewish community that was
designed to permit them to receive the special education services provided
to all in a more familiar environment. This was done on the grounds that
there was no assurance "the benefit received by the Satmar community
[was] one that the legislature [would] provide equally to other religious
(and nonreligious) groups."'' 0 3 While some have limited the case to its
narrow facts as disallowing sect-specific accommodations, it does show
that government benefits do not have to include funding to trigger
neutrality concerns. This Establishment Clause concern over government
favoritism to religion outside the funding context is developed further in
the next section, which covers the endorsement test.
B. Unpacking the Conflated Application of the MitchelllZobrest
"Direct/Indirect Aid" Paradigms to the Crisis Chaplaincy Scenario
The hospital/crisis-chaplaincy cases appear to provide a multi-layered,
implied argument that goes beyond any approved in the Supreme Court
precedent. The possible assumptions are laid out below as guideposts to
further analysis.
At times, these cases appear to acknowledge that one of the
government's purposes is to make religious counseling available, even for
those persons whose religious exercise rights are not restricted, because
such religious counseling is a good thing. If that is a government's purpose
for choosing a religious person to perform the role, there is a clear primary
effect of the government itself advancing religion. The unconstitutionality
of this scenario will be discussed in the endorsement and coercion sections.
At other times, however, the argument seems to be that these
chaplains are providing primarily secular counseling, and that any religious
counseling is at the recipient's request, so that the indirect aid paradigm
applies. One unstated step to the argument is the assumption that there is
no constitutional violation for the government to select a single religious
provider for the job, so long as that selection only favors organized religion
over non-religion, but does not specify a denominational preference.
Alternatively, the Washington Supreme Court allowed the single provider
103. Bd. ofEduc., Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702 (1994).
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organization itself to impose the religious requirement on its volunteers, on
the grounds that the government was open to using either a secular or a
religious provider. Regardless of which entity, public or private, imposes
the religious test, there is another problematic and unusual facet to this
characterization: it is a single individual, in the person of a chaplain-
rather than a selection of organizational providers-who is charged with
giving each program beneficiary that critical choice between secular and
religious counseling services. This section will address each of these three
points in turn.
First, nothing in the Supreme Court's precedent at this point would
allow a government to intentionally select a single religious organization as
the provider of government-sponsored secular counseling services solely
because the selection is nondenominational and only favors organized
religion over non-religion. As discussed above, the Mitchell and Bowen
line of cases all rest on government offering the government-owned assets
or participation in the social service program to a wide range of
organizations, using neutral, secular criteria to select providers.
Further, any test imposed by the government as a job condition, which
requires a person to be certified as a believer in good standing with an
organized religion, violates not only the Establishment Clause but is likely
to violate the little-used Article VI of the Constitution as well. Article VI
provides in part: "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public Trust under the United States. 1 °4
In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Supreme Court specified that this ban on
religious tests encompasses any requirements "which aid all religions as
against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief
in the existence of God as against those religion founded on different
beliefs,"105 including "Secular Humanism." 10 6 Torcaso, relying on both
Article VI and the First Amendment, struck down a Maryland
constitutional provision that required state office holders to declare their
belief in God. The Court held that the plaintiff, who was appointed notary
public by the Governor, could not be denied his commission because he
refused to swear the oath.
One can debate whether a volunteer position as a crisis chaplain could
ever be construed as an "Office or public Trust," but the role certainly is
official, cloaked with the mantle of authority and created to encourage
trust. Moreover, Torcaso remains precedent for the point that generally,
104. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3.
105. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
106. Id. at 495 n.ll.
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government cannot decide whether someone is qualified to carry out a
public position based on whether they believe in God or whether their
stated religion is theistic. Express religious hiring by the government is
limited to cases governed by the accommodation principle, which as of
now the Court has not extended beyond the military and prison chaplain
programs and the position of legislative chaplain based on historical
grounds and ceremonial deism.
The second pcrmutation looks at what would happen if the
government did not actively recruit a religious provider, but instead ended
up with one through a neutral selection process. There, the law may allow
the religious provider organization itself to impose a religious requirement
on its members (or employees or volunteers), but only within the context of
simultaneously prohibiting those members from engaging in religious
activities during the government program.
As noted above, one leading accommodation decision, Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, extended religious organizations' Title VII
exemption from the ban on religious employment discrimination to include
all their secular nonprofit activities. 10 7  The current debate is whether
religious organizations should forfeit their right to religious choice in hiring
if they accept government aid. 0 8  At President Bush's request, federal
agencies have modified their regulations to preserve that right to
discriminate, or preserve their religious identity, depending on one's
perspective.'0 9 These controversial new federal regulations, however, still
simultaneously prohibit religious organizations from engaging in any
religious activities while providing services in the government program.
Now that government programs are actively promoted to more intensely
religious organizations (including those previously labeled "pervasively
sectarian"), federal regulations also clearly specify that any inherently
religious activities (including worship, instruction or proselytization) must
be conducted separately in time and location from the government program
activities. 1 0
Indeed, such restrictions on religious use may be the last remaining
prohibition still required by the Establishment Clause. Thus, while current
107. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 328 (1987) (citing section 702 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-2).
108. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 8, at 51-57; Steven K. Green, Religious
Discrimination, Public Funding, and Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2002).
109. See Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec. 12, 2002). All new federal
regulations promulgated in response to this Executive Order are compiled at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/govemment/fbci. See also Gilman, supra note 8, for a critique of this
extraordinary exercise of administrative authority.
110. See, e.g., Dept. of Health and Human Serv. Reg., 45 C.F.R. § 87.2(c) (2007).
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law might allow a government to use a religious organization to provide
crisis counseling and that organization, when selected pursuant to a true
open bidding process, might be able to select its members using a religious
criterion, that organization's members would not be allowed to engage in
religious counseling or prayer while engaged in the government crisis
counseling program.
In addition, where the final result of the application of neutral secular
criteria is a single religious provider, the assertion of government selection
via an open neutral process would have to stand up to some scrutiny. In a
case like Malyon, where the "open bid process" took place in response to
litigation (after the religious chaplain group had performed the job for
seven years and was the provider in numerous local counties and
municipalities), the suggestion of a neutral process was transparently
weak.'l There is, however, some case law support for a government using
a religious provider in a "sole source" contract to perform a secular
function where the process is neutral and the religious organization is
uniquely able to perform the task." 2 Again though, while the organization
would be able to continue to enforce its religious identity through a
religious hiring or membership criterion, that organization would not be at
liberty to then use its new unique governmental position to engage in
religious discussions with program participants. And in the case of the
Crisis Chaplaincy Model, the partnership is close enough that there are
separate problems under the endorsement test.
Third, and finally, nothing in the government aid cases supports the
idea that aid is "indirect" where a single person-rather than a selection of
organizational providers-is charged with providing the individual
recipient her critical choice between secular and religious counseling
services. The indirect aid cases involve applying a government voucher to
help pay for the school the recipient has chosen, or informing a parole
officer which of several halfway houses a parolee has chosen to attend.
The decision, whether religious or secular, is made in advance, outside the
presence of the providers, and without any identifiable emotional or time
pressure. Here, the beneficiary is in an emotional situation, whether due to
illness or tragedy, and physically with an identifiably religious person. The
only substantive limitation on the government program is that the
11. Maylon v. Pierce County, 935 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Wash. 1997).
112. See, e.g., Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding constitutional federal
aid for construction of religious secondary schools abroad if, on remand, government could show
some compelling interest, such as that grantee was, as a practical matter, the only real channel for
aid in that country or area).
113. See infra Part III.C.
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beneficiary first has to indicate an interest in taking advantage of the
religious provider's clearly observable religious expertise before that
provider is allowed to engage in inherently religious activities. Laid out in
this detail, it is clear that the Crisis Chaplaincy Model sets the "indirect
aid" approach on its head. This scenario is so redolent with endorsement
and coercion concerns, it is time to turn our attention to those alternate
Establishment Clause tests.
C. Endorsement
There is unconstitutional government endorsement of religion where a
government gives special treatment to the religious and there is no burden
on religious exercise to justify that action as an accommodation. Limiting
participation in a city's crisis response team to "chaplains" who are
recommended by their clergy makes a loud public statement that the
administration believes religion is needed in times of crisis.
The "endorsement test," proposed by Justice O'Connor and
originating in the holiday display cases, asks whether a reasonable observer
would perceive the challenged religious activity as a government
endorsement of religion, when looking at it in the context as a whole.
1 14
The heart of the rationale for this approach is that "[e]ndorsement sends a
message to 'nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders, favored members of the political community.' 115
While the endorsement test is used only sporadically by the Supreme
Court, it is frequently part of the lower courts' Establishment Clause tool
kit, where it is often viewed as a subset of the Lemon test.1 16 In addition,
while there is serious doubt as to the test's command of a majority of the
new Supreme Court, it retains some importance. As recently as Van Orden
v. Perry (one of two recent cases addressing a Ten Commandments
display), Justice Breyers' controlling concurrence employed analysis very
much like the endorsement test in approving the monument on the grounds
of the Texas state capitol. He looked to the circumstances of its placement
114. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (city's
inclusion of a creche, among secular objects in its holiday display in a private shopping area, held
constitutional). See also Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a
county's Christmas-time display of a creche, standing alone on the grand staircase of the county
courthouse).
115. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (quoted in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310
(2000)).
116. See, e.g., Mellon v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (military college supper
prayer violated Lemon because of unconstitutional primary effect where state institution endorsed
the need for religion so unequivocally).
on the capitol grounds and its presence for forty years without challenge as
evidence that it had been perceived as conveying a primarily secular
message. 117  Moreover, whatever its future in that context, it retains
viability for interactive situations like the chaplaincies. When Justice
Kennedy (one of the Court's current swing votes) repudiated the
endorsement test's detailed contextual focus, his rejection was based on
reasoning that "the risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive or
symbolic accommodation is minimal" because there is no coercive
aspect. 18 Finally, the Court used the endorsement test relatively recently in
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,"9 a case with strong
similarities to the Crisis Chaplaincy Model.
In Santa Fe, the Court held unconstitutional a school policy
authorizing the student body to elect a student to deliver a "brief invocation
and/or message" before home football games to "solemnize the event" and
promote good sportsmanship. 20 A dominant issue was whether the prayer
that resulted was private speech or attributable to the school district.' 2 1 Its
reasoning forecloses the two methods a city might use to distance itself
from the endorsement problem inherent in implementing a Crisis
Chaplaincy. One is the assertion that the not-for-profit entity it contracts
with, and not the city itself, is the party that imposes a religious test on
volunteers. Another is the argument that the city is not advancing religion
by providing a chaplain on the scene because any religious conversations
that take place originate with the victim.
In Santa Fe, the Court applied the endorsement test and found a
violation based on several factors despite the school's attempt to separate
itself by a two-step election process. 22 The students first voted whether to
have an invocation at football games and next selected the student speaker
for the year. 23 The Court rejected the characterization of the student's pre-
117. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698-705 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). See also id.
at 681-92 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion) (upholding display based on monument's historical
significance and passive nature of the symbolism). But see McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S.
844 (2005) (display of Ten Commandments on court house wall violated Establishment Clause;
Justice Souter applied Lemon test and found unconstitutional religious purpose for display).
118. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also id. at 655-79 (objecting
to "the very nature of the endorsement test, with its emphasis on the feelings of the objective
observer" and the analysis of "minutiae" accompanying its contextual focus).
119. Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
120. Id. at 298, 298 n.6.
121. See generally G. Sidney Buchanan, Prayer in Governmental Institutions: The Who, The
What, and The At Which Level, 74 TEMP. L. REv. 299 (2001) (discussing Santa Fe).
122. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301.
123. Id. at 297-98.
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game prayer as private speech based on the degree of school involvement:
the board required the elections, authorized only one student speaker,
regulated the content of the message, and delivered it over the school's
public address system at a school function on school property. 24 Also, the
policy, by its own terms, "invites and encourages religious messages.' 25
Not only is a "religious message.., the most obvious method of
solemnizing an event," but an "invocation" was the only format the school
expressly suggested. 126 The Court examined the definition of "invocation"
and noted it was "a term that primarily describes an appeal for divine
assistance."'' 2 7 In addition, the school had a tradition of a student chaplain
that the election procedure replaced. For these reasons, the alleged
"'circuit-breaker' mechanism of the dual elections and student speaker
[did] not turn public speech into private speech ....,128
For a closer analogy, which mirrors the endorsement impact of the
Crisis Chaplaincy Model, the "Clergy in the Schools" case provides a
compelling argument. In Oxford v. Beaumont Independent School
District,129 the court held unconstitutional a program in which clergy were
invited into the public schools to discuss moral and lifestyle issues with
middle-school students. Although the program rules specified that the
discussions be secular and banned proselytizing,' 30 it violated the First
Amendment based on the exclusionary religious criterion for participation
and the school district's apparent endorsement of religious leaders as the
best persons to discuss such issues with students.
13 1
The district court's analysis applies readily to the Crisis Chaplaincy
Model:
The whole.., volunteer program conveyed the message that clergy
are "uniquely qualified" to carry out counseling and mentoring on
the broad range of secular topics covered by [Clergy in the Schools].
Thus, [the] program failed both the second prong of the Lemon test
124. Id. at 304.
125. Id. at 306.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 306-07.
128. Id. at 310. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding uncon-stitutional a
moment of voluntary prayer or meditation in public school based on school board's documented
religious purpose and on unconstitutionality of government endorsing prayer and sending a
message of state approval to school children).
129. Oxford v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (E.D. Tex. 2002),
remanded from Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
130. Beaumont, 240 F.3d at 465.
131. Beaumont, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
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and the endorsement test because it conveyed the message that
religion is preferred over non-religion.'
32
The Fifth Circuit opined that if the clergy were one among many types
of persons invited to discuss such issues with the students, then a clergy
program would be permissible.1 33  On remand, the district court, after
reviewing the school programs, found none that were comparable in terms
of the types of access to the students and the depth of discussions; all
programs that were arguably similar turned out to be smaller, or lecture-
format, or distinguishable in some other way.
134
Turning to the Crisis Chaplaincy Model, two distinct attributes violate
the endorsement test. First, the use of the term "chaplain" to identify the
volunteers that police call to the scene to assist victims conveys the
message that the government believes religion is necessary to face
traumatic events. Indeed, some municipalities using that model frankly
explain that "the spiritual dimension implicit in the chaplain's role" is
critical to helping people cope at such times.1 35 Without saying a word,
when someone is identified by an official badge or jacket emblazoned with
"Chaplain" and "Metropolis Police Department," the title alone introduces
the issue of religion into the city's law enforcement response. In Santa Fe,
the Court found that the school board's use of the word "invocation,"
which by its common meaning "invites the divine," was a factor showing
endorsement of a religious message.136 A city's use of the term "chaplain,"
which suggests to the public that the person is clergy or at least has
religious training and identification, 137 has a similar impact.
Second, the reasonable person in endorsement analysis is assumed to
be familiar with the program as a whole, so that the imposition of a
132. Beaumont, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 1114. (citations omitted). Compare the incomplete
approach taken in Carter (which was decided prior to Allegheny), where the Eighth Circuit
rejected the argument that the County's hospital chaplain program unconstitutionally advanced
religion because of the symbolic tie it created between government and religion, on the grounds
that the chaplain was nonsectarian, not addressing the endorsement of the religious over the
secular. Carter v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 857 F.2d 448, 456 (1988).
133. Beaumont, 240 F.3d at 472.
134. Beaumont, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
135. See, e.g., Seattle CC Site, supra note 13.
136. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304 (2000).
137. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (defining "chaplain"
as: "l.a. a clergyman appointed to officiate in a chapel ... 2. a clergyman officially attached to
the army or navy, to some public institution, or to a family or court, 3. Any person chosen to
conduct religious exercises (as for a society)").
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religious test for crisis counseling volunteers also is unconstitutional. 138
The problem exists whether the criterion is ordination, ecclesiastical
endorsement, or a detailed letter of reference from one's clergy. As
explained in the "Clergy in the Schools" decisions, this barrier to entry
conveys the unmistakable governmental message that only religious
persons-specifically, those affiliated with and approved by traditional,
organized religious bodies-are qualified to carry out the essential human
job of helping another cope with the immediate impact of facing death and
loss.13 9
Santa Fe also shows that governments cannot distance themselves
from this message of endorsement by claiming that the volunteer
organization is the one promoting a religious response. 140  The role of a
local Crisis Chaplaincy cannot be characterized as solely private speech
because of the degree of government involvement. The city (or county)
often initiates the program and, at a minimum, structures and implements
the relationship between the volunteer organization and law enforcement.
By calling chaplains to the scene of a homicide or accident, and requesting
their assistance within twenty to thirty minutes, the government gives the
chaplains a special kind of access and a unique official role. They are
relied on and perceived as part of the city's law enforcement team. One
reason for such programs, in fact, is to free up officers' and emergency
personnel's time by relieving them of the "soft" duties of assisting family
members and witnesses. Also, the city often provides the volunteers with
the use of some city assets such as jackets or office space. By choosing to
create and benefit from this relationship, a city cannot avoid all
responsibility for the organization's identity or religious discrimination.
Indeed, this type of partnership is so close that it likely would violate the
endorsement test even if the religious chaplain organization was the sole
responder to a city's request for a volunteer organization.'14
138. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (describing the "reasonable observer" of the endorsement test as both rational and
understanding the practice's history and context); compare Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd.
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 806 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasonable observer test should
focus on what is apparent to the passerby, so should be violation where private speech appears to
be government speech; courts should not be permitted to dismiss an Establishment Clause
problem based on a hypothetical person with additional contextual knowledge).
139. Beaumont, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
140. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 290.
141. Moreover, the court in Malyon simply erred on this point, given the sheriff's seven years
experience with the Christian Chaplaincy prior to the allegedly open bid. Under similar
circumstances in Santa Fe, the Court viewed the school's election process with skepticism
because it was instituted after years of having a student chaplain give the prayer. Sante Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
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In contrast, inviting clergy and pastoral counselors to participate in
disaster assistance does not send an unconstitutional message of
endorsement. In any governmental response to a large- or medium-scale
emergency, a broad variety of helpers are called to the scene. The full
response likely will include secular grief counselors and social workers, as
well as practical assistance. As the Fifth Circuit determined in "Clergy in
the Schools," there is no unconstitutional endorsement where others have
similar roles, so that there is no suggestion of governmental favoritism.
D. Coercion
The coercion test represents the rock-bottom value underlying the
Establishment Clause. As Justice Kennedy declared in the case that coined
that value as a test, Lee v. Weisman: "It is beyond dispute that, at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise."' 142  What is
debated, however, is the degree of coercion required, including whether
psychological coercion should suffice 14 3 and the extent to which Lee
applies outside the school children context. 144  By any reasonable
interpretation of Lee's principles (as reaffirmed by Santa Fe),145 the Crisis
Chaplaincy is unconstitutionally coercive.
The Lee Court held it unconstitutional for a school to invite a clergy
person to give a nonsectarian invocation and benediction to solemnize a
high school graduation. The principal had invited the clergy person (a
rabbi), provided him with "Guidelines for Civic Occasions," and instructed
him that the prayers must be nonsectarian.146 This effort to avoid
divisiveness, however, did not remedy the problem of prayers promoted by
the state. "That the intrusion was in the course of promulgating religion
that sought to be civic or nonsectarian rather than pertaining to one sect
does not lessen the offense or isolation to the objectors." 147 The school had
argued that graduation was so important an occasion that it needed to be
142. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992).
143. See id. at 643 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (coercion only violates Establishment Clause where
participation required by force of law); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of
Establishment, 7 WM. & MARY L. REv. 933 (1985) (arguing for requirement of legal coercion).
144. See Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1
(2006) (finding unlikely any attempt to extend Lee beyond the school context, given the current
Court's stated Establishment Clause views).
145. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312 (regarding student prayers to open school football game, the
Court held that even if attendance is deemed purely voluntary for every student, there is still an
"improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship").
146. Lee, 505 U.S. at 579-80.
147. Id. at 594.
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solemnized by official recognition of God's help. The Court saw the
argument as a "fundamental inconsistency" because what many might see
as a "spiritual imperative" was for the objectors "religious conformance
compelled by the State."
148
Two factors led to the finding of unconstitutional coercion. First, as a
practical matter, there was little real choice in participation. The Court
pointed to the social pressure and strong desire to attend such a significant
rite of passage and contrasted it to the legislative prayer in Marsh, "where
adults are free to enter and leave with little comment and for any number of
reasons."' 149 Second, those offended have a special vulnerability. In Lee,
the Court relied on the heightened concerns that elementary and high
school students are more vulnerable to subtle coercive pressure than are
adults. 150 Later in the decision, however, Justice Kennedy also expressed
that the "concern [about coercion] may not be limited to the context of
schools .. .
The Crisis Chaplain Model is unconstitutionally coercive under the
Lee framework. It also involves a situation where a city has initiated or
agreed to such a program, selected the provider and provided guidelines on
when prayer may occur. Any requirement that the chaplains represent
various denominations or pray in a nonsectarian way is insufficient, just as
the insistence on a more generic prayer did not save the practice in Lee.
Further, as previously discussed, the expressed reason for using the title
"chaplain" and requiring clergy endorsements is the majoritarian belief that
people need the presence of religion in times of tragedy and that an
unchurched helper is inadequate. This is exactly analogous to the school's
view, rejected in Lee, that some type of prayer was needed to solemnize the
significant occasion.
The final, essential elements of coercion are present as well: forced
encounter with the religious and special vulnerability of the audience.
When a chaplain comes to stand by the side of someone who has just
suffered a tragic loss, been abused, or witnessed a terrible death, that
person is in a uniquely vulnerable position. This point is supported by
social science research and psychological practice152 and, indeed, the
148. Id. at 595-96.
149. Id. at 597.
150. Id. at 592.
151. Id.
152. See generally DEBORAH SPUNGEN, HOMICIDE: THE HIDDEN VICTIMS: A GUIDE FOR
PROFESSIONALS (Interpersonal Violence: The Practice Series, Jon R. Conte ed., Sage
Publications 1998); JUDIE A. BUCHOLZ, HOMICIDE SURVIVORS: MISUNDERSTOOD GRIEVERS
(John D. Morgan ed., Baywood Publishing Company 2002); Chris R. Brewin, et al., Meta-
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victims' helpless and confused post-tragedy state is the very reason
proffered to have these programs. 153 While most recipients of such services
may be adults, at that moment and in that context, they cannot be presumed
free to explain calmly any objections they may have to a chaplain's
participation in their tragedy. The physical setting also is coercive because
the government has sent a chaplain to visit in one's home or to stand by
one's side. While the policy (and in most cases the practice) is that
engaging in prayer or discussing God is voluntary, simply meeting one-on-
one with a chaplain is a religious experience-one that has not been chosen
by the participant.
At least one recent case supports the contention that Lee is not limited
to the "peculiar susceptibility" of grade school and high school children.
154
While several cases had held that prayer at a public college graduation
ceremony was not coercive, based on the participants' adult age and
maturity, the Fourth Circuit held unconstitutional a supper prayer
conducted at a military college in Mellon v. Bunting.155  While
understanding that coercion is less likely with older students, the court
recognized that certain aspects of the military school environment were
calculated to break down the will of the cadets and breed conformity. In
that atmosphere, even older students were vulnerable to coercion.
Similarly, the experience of the trauma that creates the need for a crisis
chaplain at least temporarily breaks down the autonomy and independence
of the adult victims left behind. Under these circumstances, the coercion
test should be applicable to adults of any age.
In the disaster response context, there is less risk of coercion. While
these adults also are suffering from severe stress, there is no government-
planned individual encounter with a chaplain, except upon the victim's
initiative. Where the timing and situation allows the government to
implement its plan and muster the community's resources to help people
(as in the welcome centers established in host states for Katrina refugees),
analysis of Risk Factors for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Trauma-Exposed Adults, 68(5) J.
OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 748 (2000); see also Alexander C. McFarlane,
Psychiatric Morbidity Following Disasters: Epidemiology, Risk and Protective Factors, in JUAN
LOPEZ-IBOR, DISASTERS AND MENTAL HEALTH 37 (Juan Jos6 Lopez-lbor et al. eds., John Wiley
& Sons Ltd. 2005) (noting importance of immediate post-trauma period as critical factor in
recovery); Anthony V. Rubonis & Leonard Bickman, Psychological Impairment in the Wake of
Disaster: The Disaster-Psychopathology Relationship, 109(3) PSYCHOL. BULL. 384 (1991).
153. See supra, note 15 and accompanying text.
154. See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussed in Doobosh, supra note
12, at 1514-16); see also Bindon, supra note 12 (arguing that coercion test should apply to
military because the culture promotes conformity, which makes personnel susceptible to coercion,
similar to high school students).
155. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 356.
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any chaplains provided will be part of a broad array of services, including
mental health professionals. In addition, meeting in a large gathering
center is qualitatively different from meeting in one's own home.
Moreover, in an unfolding public emergency, where there can be no
deliberate government assignment of a chaplain to a particular person, any
interaction will lack any coercive meaning. Finally, victims in a disaster
often are deprived of their usual community structure, including religious
care. In those circumstances, for government to provide clergy to conduct
worship services or engage in other religious conduct is an accommodation,
not an endorsement or coercion.
Part IV. Towards a Comprehensive Model
The conclusions drawn about the Crisis Chaplaincy Model and clergy
disaster response provide some helpful guidelines that may be used to shed
light on the other types of government chaplaincies, including those that
are the subject of current interest and those yet to receive judicial scrutiny.
The argument has already been made for extending the
accommodation rationale from situations where government itself restricts
persons' movement (and thus burdens religious exercise) to contexts such
as hospital inpatients and disaster relief, where one's access to religious
services is burdened by exigent circumstances, and the government is in
some sort of caretaker role.1 56 There, following the military and prison
model, government makes an effort to replicate the types of religious
experiences to which the affected persons would have access "but for" the
difficult situation taking them outside their ordinary milieu. Because the
restricted movement is more temporary, one would expect the
corresponding accommodation to be less extensive and precise-and
typically it is. Few hospitals, if any, will employ chaplains representing the
diversity found in the military system, for example.
While most of this Article has separated the two types of rationales for
government chaplaincies for purpose of clearer and deeper analysis, this
Part begins to examine how the two rationales intersect and proposes
graduated guidelines along a more nuanced continuum. As the argument
becomes increasingly attenuated for lifting a circumstantial burden
impeding religious exercise, government's role must be correspondingly
less active with respect to facilitating religious exercise. Once there is no
identifiable burden to be lifted, government no longer may provide
exclusively religious personnel or religious counseling. When
government's purpose is helping people by attending to their emotional or
156. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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spiritual needs-needs that go beyond physical and material care-any
facilitation of a religious response must be wholly voluntary, supported by
government neutrality and choice. The next step is to analyze possible
accommodation arguments for the common existing practices: chaplains
for government hospital outpatients and for fire and police department
personnel.
The VA hospital outpatient context may be the next step along the
continuum. Looking at the argument put forth by the Seventh Circuit years
ago in Baz, if veterans would get a certain level of pastoral counseling and
chaplain services at any private hospital, then perhaps they should not have
to forfeit their earned right to free medical care in the VA in order to obtain
those now-standard services. The "burden" potentially associated with free
government health care is being preemptively lifted, by affording the same
type of spiritual care services offered elsewhere. This argument imposes a
clear limit, however, on the types of services that the government hospital
can offer; it cannot be on the forefront of integrating religious faith and
healthcare, but rather must be limited to those services that are standard
elsewhere. The burden should be on the government entity providing
religious care to show that each particular service it offers is required by
JCAHO standards.
When the circumstances are that far departed from the accommodation
model, however, government's actions need to be constrained further to
safeguard their primary effect and the message sent by the unusual conduct
of providing religious services to persons who are able to obtain them
independently. Where the government offers chaplains to outpatients as
part of its healthcare system, it is critical that (1) such services be one
among many choices, including functionally similar secular alternatives, so
that any use of them is truly voluntary, and (2) there is no express or
implied government message preferring or recommending the religious
provider.
One further twist in the government hospital chaplain context is the
dual role they play. The hospital is permitted, constitutionally, to employ
personnel to provide religious services to those with restricted movement,
such as inpatients. There may be some facilities where finances only allow
for one person to perform both the accommodation needs of inpatients and
the mind-body care of outpatients. In the face of well-established
institutional constraints, and analogizing to the administrative reasons for
military chaplains in large cities, allowing one person to perform both roles
may be defensible. This is distinguishable from the Crisis Chaplaincy
Model because there, the chaplains have only one role, which is to assist
persons who are out in the community.
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Such situations, however, require extra care to communicate
government neutrality and protect freedom of choice. There can be no
defense, for example, for the excesses cited in the Nicholson opinion,
where one VA hospital provided a written statement to its patients: "We
believe that faith plays an important role in a person's sense of health and
wellness." "Faith" most commonly translates as "religious faith" and, in
the context of a "spiritual assessment," asking the patient how frequently
she attended church would be understood as such. Once a government
hospital is offering a more religious program than is generally available or
stating opinions promoting religion as part of patient care, then the
government has crossed the line and is "itself advancing religion." In
addition, any type of detailed questioning about a patient's religious
practices and spiritual leanings must be administered in a neutral context,
which means by someone other than a chaplain. Where a clergy person is
asking those questions in a one-on-one meeting, with the only limit being
the patient's theoretical right to request that the questioning be stopped,
there is a clear and unconstitutionally coercive effect.
Turning to the police and fire chaplaincies requires developing and
testing different rationales. Neither the long shifts common in fire
departments nor the "para-military" authority structure of the police
department provide much traction as grounds for providing these
government employees with chaplains. What is unique about their roles,
and reminiscent of the military, is that these men and women lay their lives
on the line to protect society. The nature and severity of that stress
understandably may lead to a need for counseling, of the religious or the
secular type. Unlike in the military, however, their government
employment situation does not impose an obstacle to obtaining that
counseling.
Facing death, however, may create a need for organized religion's
sacramental response. The court in Nicholson observed that there have
always been chaplains in military hospitals; in the past, however, their role
was sacramental, including the role of administering last rites, which is
essential in many faith traditions. This rationale provides some support for
fire department chaplains, at least for deploying clergy to the scenes of fires
where lives are at risk and to other similar emergency responses. It fails
with respect to police department chaplains, however, because the nature of
the risk is so different. Typically, when police officers are risking death, it
is on the streets tracking down and confronting alleged criminals, which are
not the sorts of situations where a police chaplain would participate or stay
on the scene. The sacramental rationale functions well only where the risk
of death is in a fixed location and at a predictable time.
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Where police, fire or other government emergency personnel want the
religious counseling of a chaplain to sort out their emotional and spiritual
response to the issues of violence and death they face, they are in a
situation fairly analogous to the victims in the Crisis Chaplaincy Model.
While the endorsement and coercion problems are less prominent in the
institutional setting than in the one-on-one meetings between chaplain and
victim, the ability to meet one's own religious needs in the community is
similarly clear-cut.
Nevertheless, many people have a spiritual need to obtain comfort and
guidance from a distinctly religious perspective and from religious
personnel when faced with tragic death and loss. While it is not the proper
role of government to provide that religious counsel where it can be
obtained in the community, it is in everyone's interest for that fundamental
need to be met and for clergy and chaplains to train and prepare to fulfill
that role in a large-scale disaster.
One constitutional method of accomplishing that goal is to maintain
referral lists of clergy and credentialed chaplains, from a diversity of faith
traditions, who are trained in the art of responding to crisis and loss and
willing to volunteer (or respond on a fee-for-service basis) in response to
requests. Police, fire and other front-line government agencies could
provide such information to their employees, in a neutral manner, as part of
a broad spectrum of available services without negative constitutional
impact. Similarly, where cities deploy a "crisis response team" to meet the
immediate emotional needs of victims, it would be constitutional to give
those responders a clergy/chaplain referral list. As they go about the task
of helping victims by calling on established support networks, for those
victims who express some religious need but do not have a clergy person to
call, offering to contact a trained clergy person or chaplain to meet that
need is an appropriate middle ground. At least one court has upheld the
constitutionality of government maintaining and providing a list of trained
and willing clergy in the government health clinic context. 
157
With this approach, clergy could prepare for disaster response and
meet any immediate religious needs of victims in crisis without affecting
the freedom of nonreligious victims and nonreligious crisis volunteers.
Also, this route removes the coercion concern. It is human nature to feel
more comfortable declining an interaction with an unknown, absent person,
and less so when already speaking face-to-face to someone who is helping
157. See Greenville Women's Clinic v. Comm'r S.C. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 317
F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding South Carolina statute regulating abortion clinic by
interpreting it as satisfied by clinic's maintaining list of clergy available for counseling, to be
provided upon a woman's request).
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you. Finally, only this alternative route succeeds in placing government's
role in providing religious counseling in the "indirect aid" category. For
the municipality interested in addressing the entire spectrum of needs of its
hardest-hit citizens, and the generous clergy and chaplains who feel called
to help, a referral process is a practical approach and the farthest the
Establishment Clause can be stretched.
Conclusion
The impact of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the Crisis
Chaplaincy Model will not be to deprive victims of support in the
immediate aftermath of tragic circumstances. Looking at the inspiring
work done through the Trauma Intervention Programs (TIP), which was
founded by a mental health professional, for example, shows that citizen
volunteers can successfully provide twenty-four hour responsive, emotional
support to those traumatized by loss without a religious litmus test. 158 For a
local government to determine that the crisis volunteers who perform that
function in their city should be called chaplains and to require that they first
obtain a formal recommendation from their clergy to qualify is
insupportable. It would be more surprising absent the current context,
where a Supreme Court Justice argues that government may promote a
majoritarian religious worldview, and states embrace religion-permeated,
"transformational" prison programming.15 9 The Establishment Clause is in
a state of great flux, haunted by a parting question by Justice O'Connor:
"Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state
must therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system
that has served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?"
'160
As government partners more frequently with increasingly more
sectarian organizations on social service initiatives, more attention will
need to be paid to issues of endorsement and coercion. To say that only
school children are subject to such forces is to turn a blind eye to the reality
158. See, e.g., Robert M. Winston, TIP Trauma Intervention Program: Angels of Mercy &
Compassion, FIREHOUSE, July 22-26, 2003, at 116, available at http://www.firehouse.com.
159. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885-912 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(asserting that this is a monotheistic country). See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of
Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2006), afjfd,
2007 U.S. App. Lexis 27928 (8th Cir. Dec. 3, 2007) (holding unconstitutional Iowa program
offering special privileges and training for prisoners who participated in "transformational"
evangelical Christian program). See also Shelia Suess Kennedy & Linda McIntyre Hall, What
Separation of Church and State?, 5 J. L. Soc'Y 389 (2004) (approx. 70% of religious leaders
surveyed did not think they had to exclude prayers while delivering services funded directly by
the state).
160. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 882 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that adults are not operating as mature, rational, wholly-autonomous
persons at all times, especially at the point where many social services are
needed and offered. These doctrines will need to be reanimated and further
developed as the full implications of the Faith-Based Initiative and the
Roberts Court continue to unfold.
The people who perform the selfless and demanding work of
comforting victims of personal tragedy and public catastrophe are heroes
and deserve nothing but praise for their efforts, which appear to be carried
out with the greatest respect and sensitivity. The Establishment Clause line
is often hard to draw. In this case, however, it is clear that those who do
this work as persons of faith must do so alongside those who do it solely as
persons of compassion.
